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 This thesis explains changing rhetorical justifications for German defense and security 
policy via an ontological security lens. It explores the roles that contested identity narratives play 
in shaping the public aspects of German policy by examining the cases of ongoing defense 
budget debates and the interventions/troop deployments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the 
NATO presence in the Baltic states.  
Through these cases it is demonstrated that policy is often justified not through appeals to 
the national interest or commitment to liberal values, but rather through appeals to historical 
memory and a German responsibility to a variety of interchangeable sub-narratives. As crises 
arise, various German governments activate and deactivate certain sub-narratives in order to 
present their response to the crisis in a way that is consistent with the German sense of self, thus 
demonstrating attempts to maintain ontological security. It also shown that these sub-narratives 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since reunification, German foreign and defense policy has been characterized by routine 
contestations between different national narratives to justify action or inaction. Whether it be a 
debate over increasing defense spending or deploying combat troops to far away theaters, 
strategic level politicians and military leaders each try to utilize and justify their positions based 
on their interpretations of German identity and history. Recently, these debates have been 
described by Ulrike Esther Franke as in a “dreamland”1 and by Andreas Kluth as “strategically 
frivolous”2. Christoph von Marschall has further pressed this point, characterizing the state of 
German strategic foreign and defense policy as in a diskursives wachkoma, or a discursive 
vegetative state.3 Couched primarily in terms of identity, the major political parties of Germany 
have been routinely reluctant to implement concrete proposals regarding defense spending or 
troop deployments. This is not to say that there have not been developments in policy, even 
major ones. The central questions of this essay are 1) how does the German political community 
                                               
1 Ulrike Esther Franke, “Germany’s defence policy: still living in dreamland,” European Council on 
Foreign Relations, last updated 21 September 2018, available at 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germanys_defence_policy_still_living_in_dreamland.  
 
2 Andreas Kluth, “Germany’s Strategic Frivolousness,” Handelsblatt Today, last updated October 5, 
2017, available at: https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/opinion/foreign-policy-germanys-strategic-
frivolousness/23569552.html?ticket=ST-1005635-PcUYIfhe2tbaNQS7lObr-ap1.  
 
3 Hans Monath, “Trotz aller Krisen noch nicht aufgewacht,” Der Tagesspiegel, last updated August 17, 
2018, available at: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik-trotz-aller-krisen-
noch-nicht-aufgewacht/22926588.html.  
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justify its foreign policy behavior and 2) why is there often a discrepancy between Germany’s 
rhetorical foreign policy ambition and the actual implementation of policy?  
This analysis utilizes an ontological security approach to studying foreign policy. 
Scholarly explanations of German foreign policy widely emphasize the importance of historical 
memory in affecting external behavior. In particular, the lessons of history are described as 
forming the elements that describe Germany’s “strategic culture”, a concept described by Snyder 
as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior 
that members of a national strategic community have acquired.”4 However, many of these 
descriptions are overly fixed and presuppose a singular national culture. Descriptions of 
Germany as only a civilian power or a trading state ignore the internal political dynamics that 
form foreign policy in a given time. Ontological security derives its analytical strength from this 
gap. Some authors, namely Leithner and Lantis, have hinted at the core elements of this 
approach, highlighting the dynamics that place German foreign policy “in flux”, specifically in 
terms of historical memory and strategic culture. This essay argues that Germany’s attempts to 
maintain ontological security deviates from general theoretical predictions of state behavior, 
while complicating the process of defense policy making.  
It will begin with an assessment of constructivist and specifically ontological accounts of 
German foreign policy, emphasizing their explanatory power in regard to the German case. 
Following this, the theory of ontological security will be explained in detail, building the 
scholarly case for this method’s strength in explaining deviant defense policy behavior. Four 
cases studies will then be used to explore the previously stated research questions: 1) defense 
spending, 2) interventions in the Balkans, 3) the war in Afghanistan, and 4) contributions to 
                                               
4 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Malibu: 
RAND Air Force, 1977): p. 8.  
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NATO deterrent forces in the Baltics. These cases cover the spectrum of German defense policy 
issues, and provide a necessary depth to explore a variety of competing ideational dynamics. 
Furthermore, each case has been argued through competing theoretical lenses, making them 

























CHAPTER 2: CLASSICAL REALIST AND CONSTRUCTIVIST ROOTS 
An important theoretical departure of this thesis is the way in which the state is viewed as 
a unit of analysis. As will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, ontological 
security stems from the fields of psychology and sociology. The implication of this then is that 
state behavior is reflective of human behavior, and can be explained via psychological and 
sociological means. This idea that politics and international relations is hardly novel, and has in 
fact been the core of classical realist thought for time immemorial. Indeed, Hans Morgenthau, 
the “founder of realism” wrote in his introduction to Politics Among Nations that “politics, like 
society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”5 By 
using “human nature” and subsequent social behavior as a foundation for the unit of analysis 
departure point, it allows an entry point for critical theories to make meaningful contributions.  
 The idea of human nature, or rather that human behavior can be reflected in a state’s 
political behavior, is also reflected in what is often presented as realism’s theoretical antithesis: 
constructivism. A critical difference however is that, for constructivists, it is not human nature 
but rather the power of human ideas and social structures that shape political behavior. 
Nevertheless, both theories avoid the “blackboxing” of the state that both neorealists and 
neoliberal theories suffer from with their overemphasis on economic and game theory driven 
mechanisms. This is not to say all theories from alternative international relations schools are 
                                               
5 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Seventh Edition 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006): p. 4.  
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beyond use. For example, Walt’s balance of threat theory6 is particularly useful in putting 
German behavior in stark contrast to the expected and empirically consistent behavior of 
balancing threatening Russian behavior with defense budget increases. This is precisely the 
reasoning for an ontological security approach. German behavior is often inconsistent with 
expected patterns of international behavior and the justifications of such foreign and security 
policy behavior is presented to the German public in identity terms, as a form of a new German 
Sonderweg in foreign affairs that emphasizes varying narratives of responsibility.  
 Several of the key assumptions of constructivism are useful as an entry point into 
ontological security. First, that social structures are partly defined by shared experiences, 
expectations, or knowledge. These social structures are then largely dependent on ideas, or rather 
the shared nature of these ideas.7 As will be seen in the following chapters, the shared knowledge 
that forms these social structures, be they the German state itself or within parties and 
government ministries, are critical elements to the German political effort to maintain 
ontological security. The second facet of constructivism is that these social structures include 
material resources like capital and military hardware.8 In constructivist literature, material 
resources acquire meaning through the structure of the shared knowledge in which they are 
embedded. In the German case, as will be seen in the defense budget case, German military 
resources are embedded in a social structure that is very hesitant about the development and use 
                                               
6 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): p. 17.  
 
7 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” in Theories of War and Peace ed. Michael E. 






of military capabilities. Finally, these social structures are not merely within actors’ thoughts or 
in material capabilities, but in distinct rhetorical practices.9 These structures are highly visible in 
the German defense planning and implementation process, and are routinely activated by 
political actors seeking to justify their varying policy proposals.  
These three constructivist elements, while not the central constituent elements of 
ontological security theory, provide a useful grounding for understanding the critical theoretical 
nature of an ontological security approach. National identity, or rather varying narratives of that 
identity, is certainly defined by shared knowledge and expressed in the practices of governments. 
Furthermore, the social construction of national identity also embeds material capabilities within 
that chosen identity narrative, a concept that will be clearly demonstrated in the following 
chapters. The following section will give a detailed explanation of both ontological security and 
provide the theoretical basis for the remainder of the analysis. Importantly, it will show how 
political reflections on historical narratives strongly influence the development of threat 
perceptions, moral justifications, and the relationships Germany chooses to utilize in addressing 
















CHAPTER 3: ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY- OPERATIONALIZING IDENTITY 
Early attempts to utilize national identity and culture to describe state behavior took the 
form of analyses of “strategic culture”. As noted in the introduction, strategic culture is defined 
by Snyder as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired.”10 This concept has 
been utilized by Lantis to describe Germany’s policies towards both Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
describing the cultural background (i.e. historical memory) to security policy-making.11 A key 
issue with strategic culture however is it presupposes fixed national “pathologies” that attempt a 
predictive capability. Too little emphasis is placed on the role of contestation over a variety of 
“strategic cultures”, though some scholars have noted the coincidence of changing policies and 
changing political narratives. These analyses largely exist outside of an ontological basis, and are 
thus left grasping for a causal mechanism to refine the argument. It’s this gap that the ontological 
concept can help to fill, by providing a useful set of terms and concepts to guide research.  
Ontological security as a theory began in the fields of psychology and sociology, with 
Anthony Giddens defining the concept as a “stable sense of self-identity,” that is “sustained 
primarily through routine.”12 Subsequent scholars have extrapolated this concept into 
                                               
10 Snyder, p. 8.  
 
11 Jeffrey Lantis, “The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in 
Kosovo,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 1 (2002): pp. 21-46.  
 
12 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Hoboken: 
Wiley, 1991): Chp. 2.  
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international relations, with Mitzen and Larson describing the development as a reinterpretation 
of the idea of security seeking. Security in traditional IR theories is taken in the most literal sense 
of territorial integrity. However, in ontological security it is argued that states seek a stable sense 
of “self” as well, expressed in sentiments of national identity.13 This is similar to the strategic 
culture concept, which Subotic describes as “cultural and cognitive boundaries which sanction or 
constrain activities of political actors.”14 What is ultimately created is an autobiographical 
identity narrative, a construction that states use to give their own behavior on the international 
scene meaning. These narratives can also be effectively used as “cloaks”, to give rhetorical 
meaning to interest driven behavior. This main narrative is made up of multilayered sub-
narratives that can be activated or deactivated as policies change to address external crises. These 
crises challenge the state identity narrative, and often put immense pressure on a state’s need to 
preserve ontological security.15 Importantly, physical and ontological security needs can conflict, 
and can lead to contradictory policies. Subotic notes that states may actually compromise some 
aspects of their material security to maintain their identity.16 This possibly provides an 
                                               
 
13 Jennifer Mitzen and Kyle Larson, “Ontological Security and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics, last updated August 2017, available at: 
http://oxfordre.com/politics/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-458?rskey=Wop6OZ&result=1.   
 
14 Jelena Subotic, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” Foreign Policy Analysis 
12 (2016): p. 613.  
 
15 Ibid., p. 614.   
 
16 Ibid.   
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explanation to instances in which states do not balance threats as would be expected in neorealist 
theory.  
Ontological security theory has been used fruitfully by scholars to examine tensions on 
the Korean peninsula17, ongoing violence between Israelis and Palestinians18, and for examining 
the US intervention in the Philippines in the 1950s.19 While previous studies have utilized dyadic 
state to state relations, Subotic’s work has shown that there is ample room for an ontological 
exploration of the domestic determinants of defense and foreign policy. Berenskoetter and 
Giegerich20 and Karp21 have utilized the approach separately to explore Germany’s position 
towards NATO and behavior during the Eurozone crisis (particularly towards Greece), however 
there remains room for a systematic ontological security approach across the breadth of German 
security policy.  
                                               
17 Derek Bolton, “North Korea’s sense of identity main obstacle to nuclear negotiations,” The 
Conversation, last updated February 9, 2017, available at: https://theconversation.com/north-koreas-deep-
sense-of-national-identity-is-the-main-obstacle-to-nuclear-negotiations-72686.  
 
18 Amir Lupovici, “Ontological dissonance, clashing identities, and Israel’s unilateral steps towards the 
Palestinians,” Review of International Studies 38 (2012): pp. 809-833.  
 
19 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993): pp. 297-
320.  
 
20 Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis 
of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies 19, no. 3 (2010): pp. 
407-452. 
 
21 Regina Karp, “Identity and anxiety: Germany’s struggle to lead,” European Security 27, no. 1 (2018): 
pp. 58-81.  
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 What then, is Germany’s main autobiographical identity narrative? Some try to explain 
Germany’s autobiographical narrative as being one of pragmatic risk aversion, choosing to avoid 
certain policy rules or guidelines in order to avoid facing a test of its external credibility or 
internal safety.22 There is little evidence to this argument in terms of defense affairs, and 
quantitative studies have proven this narrative to be an externally applied fiction. Even when 
behavior may appear risk-averse, it usually takes the form of a non-action to preserve a stable 
sense of self rather than any particular casualty or safety aversion. Indeed, a study from the 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs found similar rates of risk aversion within 
both the United States and Germany, with an emphasis on military officials, senior diplomats, 
and academics of security affairs.23 Furthermore, risk aversion is hardly a sufficient element to 
make up an entire main narrative. There are no illusions to history or a common mythology; in 
fact, there are never any public allusions to this idea by political leaders. Risk-aversion can 
hardly be considered Germany’s narrative.  
 Alternative accounts emphasis economic power as central to identity, with an argument 
that Germany’s economic position endows upon it a leadership responsibility within Europe. 
Szabo has described Germany as a trading state, taking a realist-style view that Germany’s 
autobiographical narrative is now as a trading state, and that its economic centrality in Europe 
allowed the state to reclaim its pride following the downfall of the Nazi regime. He points 
especially to the pride Germans had in the Deutsch Mark prior to the introduction of the Euro, 
                                               
22 Jessica Riester and Kirsten Verclas, “Nuclear Energy in the U.S. and Germany: Weighing the Risks,” 
AICGS Issue Brief 42 (2012): pp. 4-6.  
 
23 Julia Howald, et. al., “Transatlantic Risk Governance Survey: Risk Averse Germans and Risk Friendly 
Americans?” (Berlin: Stiftuing Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013): pp. 23-42.  
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comparing this source of national pride to French views of its nuclear arsenal.24 Kundnani has 
separately noted that Germany has embraced a new form of continental hegemony, accepting a 
leadership role in the continent that can impose financial reforms on neighbors on behalf of its 
economic interests.25 This narrative was embraced to a degree during the Eurozone crisis, but it 
led to a serious form of ontological stress as Berlin began putting immense economic pressure on 
Greece, a country in which German troops had committed atrocities during the Second World 
War. A problem with this narrative is that it is rarely used as an actual justification for policy, 
and it is seldom seen in policy outcomes themselves. Some high-profile cases such as Germany’s 
energy relations with Russia and the Eurozone crisis have been a notable exception however, 
possibly showing that a “silent narrative” may have developed surrounding the role of economic 
interests in shaping foreign policy, though emphasizing the role of economic interests often fits 
within different narratives, such as responsibility towards multilateralism or to reject power 
politics and seek détente.  
The most mainstream and accepted accounts have argued that “civilian power” is the 
central narrative, with its themes of multilateralism, antimilitarism, and a normative focus on 
democracy and human rights.26 Others, particularly after German involvement in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, have characterized it as a ‘normalizing’ power, reflecting what Franke has 
                                               
24 Stephen F. Szabo, Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London: Bloomsbury, 2015): pp. 
2-4.  
 
25 Hans Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): pp. 107-114.  
 




described as a ‘continually upward trajectory’27 of increasingly ‘normal’ foreign policy behavior 
that does not exclude the use of military force.28 Both are important to understanding the 
multilayered sub-narratives of the main narrative. Leithner has combined both approaches and 
conceptualizes these elements as Germany’s “lessons of history.”29 What will be seen in the 
cases below is how this variety of lessons are reinterpreted during a moment of crisis to justify 
policies to a political establishment and public that is very sensitive and receptive to historically 
justified argumentation.  
To these a level of refining must be added however. Techau provides a more exhaustive 
list of the various elements that form Germany’s autobiographical narrative. 30 Each of these 
elements can be understood as an individual sub-narrative which can be activated or deactivated 
at a given time as policies come under pressure from external shocks:  
1. Shame and a rejection of normalcy (otherwise called historical guilt) 
2. Militant pacifism and anti-militarism 
3. The entitlement to be left in peace 
4. The lack of sovereignty during the Cold War (and it being regained) 
5. Restraint, passivity, and timidity  
6. European multilateralism 
                                               
27 Franke, “Germany’s defence policy.”  
 
28 James Sperling, “Neither Hegemony or Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post-Cold War 
Europe,” British Journal of Political Science 31 (2001): pp. 394-395. 
 
29 Anika Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory, and National Interest (Boulder: 
First Forum Press, 2009): pp. 1-5.  
 
30 Jan Techau, “No Strategy Please, We’re German—The Eight Elements that Shaped German Strategic 
Culture,” in Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Strategic and Operational Challenges ed. Christopher 
M. Schnaubelt (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2011): pp. 73-89.  
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7. Transatlanticism (specifically through NATO) 
8. A general consensus to avoid discussions of defense strategy in public 
 
 These elements are consistent with other authors descriptions of civilian power and provide a 
useful checklist for analyzing which sub-narrative German elites choose to activate. For 
example, as will be seen below, German ministers routinely activated sub-narratives of historical 
guilt, regained sovereignty, and a commitment to transatlanticism through NATO during the 
conflicts in the Balkans (though not always consistently). Importantly, all of these themes at one 
point or another are activated by political leaders to justify policy stagnation or variation. Most 
will be exemplified in the cases below, often being selectively activated to build a sufficient 
rhetorical argument to gain a coalition for action.  
These specific themes all contribute to a central autobiographical narrative of what 
Leithner identifies as Verantwortungspolitik (politics of responsibility)31, and it is how the 
various sub-narratives are activated that describe responsibility to what. As different elements 
are activated, they can imply a responsibility to foreswear military operations or high defense 
spending, a responsibility to prevent mass atrocities, a responsibility to allies, or a responsibility 
to economic interests. Indeed, responsibility is perhaps the most common theme in defense 
policy speeches or those appealing for military action. Analyzing how these various sub-
narratives are formed in different constellations can go a long way in understanding how a need 
to maintain ontological security complicates German defense policy-making, as it is these 
groupings of elements that create the rhetorical justification for action (or deviant/non-action). 
Responsibility, particularly in the German case, should be understood as a fairly malleable 
                                               
31 Leithner, p. 8.  
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concept that is interpreted both through and to fit within certain identity narratives. For example, 
in the multilateral sphere, Berenskoetter and Giegerich have noted how unilateral moves or a 
preference towards either transatlantic or European forums can be described as a choice by 
Berlin to choose the option that best maintains a certain chosen sub-narrative to justify policy 
actions.32 Also, what is occasionally seen are discrepancies between rhetoric and action, which 
can also be explained through an ontological security lens. While certain sub-narratives may be 
deactivated in the process of justification, they often remain their relevance during the carrying 
out of action.  
The following case studies will explore how these various sub-narratives are activated at 
different times in Germany’s recent history to justify action in order to explain both variation (or 
the lack thereof) in policy and discrepancies between rhetoric and implementation. Beginning 
with recent debates over whether or not defense spending should be increased, it will proceed 
through three major deployments of German forces in the last two decades: the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, and the NATO Baltic deterrent forces. What each will show is how the main 
narrative of responsibility is reinterpreted via its sub-elements to create rhetorical backing for 







                                               





CHAPTER 4: CONTESTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
While debates over the use of historical memory and national identity are most often 
applied to overseas deployments, perhaps the most politically charged policy item in Berlin 
defense circles has become the amount spent on defense. So much so, that criticism of defense 
spending levels by US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, led to calls for his expulsion.33 
For most of the new century, the marked decreases in spending were not criticized within 
German policy circles, though were often treated with derision by NATO allies, particularly the 
United States. This is especially indicative of the “silent” sub-narrative to avoid discussing 
defense matters in public. Certainly, the primary driver for reduced spending was the end of the 
Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Interestingly, however, the narrative that accompanied 
the downturn was not in such a realist, ‘balance of threat’ fashion. The post-Cold War civilian 
and economic power narratives dominated discourse in Berlin, promoting a worldview that hard 
power had little to do in geopolitics in the new century. The policy establishment tied German 
policy to this worldview, interpreting German history as part of the broader narrative of the ‘end 
of history’, with an incumbent responsibility not to pursue (or be seen to be pursuing) any form 
of military power.34 This is closely reflective of Techau’s “right to be left in peace” and “militant 
                                               
33 Laurenz Gehrke, “Call for US envoy to Germany to be sent home over NATO spending row,” Politico 




34 Franke, “German defence policy.”  
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pacifist” sub-narratives. Analysts became aware of deficiency issue as early as 199435, and the 
problems appear to have been endemic and enduring ever since. A number of highly-visible 
embarrassments occurred as German troops took part in operations and exercises abroad, often 
having to rely entirely on the transport and logistics of NATO or outside partners. Most 
glaringly, German soldiers taking part in a NATO exercise in 2011 used broomsticks painted 
black in lieu of gun barrels due to equipment shortages.36 In examining readiness measures, the 
picture is even more stark. At the end of 2017, none of Germany’s submarines or air transport 
jets could be deployed due to maintenance shortfalls, 21,000 officer positions remained 
unfilled37, and only 4 of its 128 Eurofighter combat jets were ready for deployment.38  
The narrative of responsibility in terms of defense spending most often activated sub-
narratives 2, 3, 5, and was indicative of a silent 8, highlighting an anti-militarist pledge against a 
viable military force on the continent, while also emphasizing restraint and a “right to be left 
alone” line that Germans know best how not to cause conflict in Europe. The general 
responsibility narrative surrounding defense spending then, is one of a responsibility not to seek 
                                               
35 Thomas Durell-Young, “Trends in German Defense Policy: The Defense Policy Guidelines and the 
Centralization of Operational Control,” Royal United Services Institute (report, 1994, London).  
 
36 Elisabeth Braw, “The Bundeswehr Backs Away from the Brink: Germany Patches Up its Military,” 
Foreign Affairs, last updated January 19, 2016, available at: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-01-19/bundeswehr-backs-away-brink.  
 
37 “Germany’s lack of military readiness ‘dramatic,’ says Bundeswehr commissioner,” Deutsche Welle, 
last updated February 20, 2018, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-lack-of-military-
readiness-dramatic-says-bundeswehr-commissioner/a-42663215.  
 
38 Chase Winter, “Only 4 of Germany’s 128 Eurofighters combat ready—report,” Deutsche Welle, last 




material hegemony on the continent. A push to increase defense spending, be it on NATO input 
targets or a more output oriented marker, clashes strongly with the antimilitarist element of the 
central autobiographical narrative. Traditionally, opposition to higher defense spending comes 
from the Social Democrats, Greens, and the Left parties, each activating in their own way the 
antimilitarist sub-narrative.39 A commonly used refrain is that an increasingly robust German 
military would counteract Germany’s civilian and economic power, with little mention of the 
material necessities of enabling economic power.40 Tellingly in regard to sub-narrative 8, the 
public only widely became aware of the sorry readiness state of the Bundeswehr during the 2011 
‘broomstick’ debacle.41  
By 2014, Germany’s autobiographical narrative came under immense pressure as Russia 
annexed Crimea, the first forceful change of borders in Europe since Germany had done so itself 
during the Second World War. As international policymakers and commentators began 
comparing Russian behavior in Crimea to German behavior towards Czechoslovakia in 1938, 
Germany’s staunch soft power approach came under immense pressure. Suddenly the state of the 
Bundeswehr was under more scrutiny, as the threat of interstate conflict between Russia and the 
West returned. While issues of low-spending leading to ineffective armed forces are not isolated 
entirely to Germany, it is a particularly glaring case and has been met with criticisms from 
NATO allies. Though perhaps most vociferously from the United States, other allies such as 
                                               
39 Caspar Kolster, “German Elections: Party Views on Security and Defense,” German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, last updated September 15, 2017, available at: 
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2017/09/15/german-elections-party-views-security-and-defense.  
 
40 Techau, “No Strategy Please, We’re German,” p. 92.  
 
41 Braw, 2016.  
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Britain, France, and Poland have voiced concerns about the state of the Bundeswehr and its 
ability to contribute to overall alliance readiness.42 East European allies, as will be shown later, 
have made explicit calls for greater German responsibility on the continent. This is a fairly recent 
change, as a narrative of wanting to avoid making allies nervous was the common refrain in the 
immediate post-Cold War era, reflective of the “restraint” sub-narrative.  
After the crisis in Ukraine began, the main responsibility narrative began to shift, 
including a strong turn away from militant pacifism and towards transatlanticism reflected 
through pledges of increased NATO spending at the 2014 alliance summit, with particular 
support from Christian Democratic politicians.43 Both Chancellor Merkel44 and former foreign 
minister (now president) Frank-Walter Steinmeier45 have pledged that Germany must “do more” 
and “take on more responsibility” commiserate with its power.  However, as predicted by 
ontological security theory, this promised policy change put pressure on the main 
autobiographical narrative. In this instance, the ontological pressure has severely complicated the 
defense strategy development process. Though at the NATO summit in 2014 and in subsequent 
public appearances, Merkel pledged that Germany would reach the 2% of GDP spending target 
                                               
42Christoph von Marschall, Wir verstehen die Welt nicht mehr: Deutschlands Entfremdung von seinen 
Freunden (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2018): pp. 15-17.  
 
43 Jan Techau, The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe (Brussels: Carnegie 
Europe): p. 3.  
 
44 Jefferson Chase, “Merkel: Germany to heavily increase Bundeswehr budget,” Deutsche Welle, last 
updated October 16, 2016, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-to-heavily-increase-
bundeswehr-budget/a-36054268.   
 




by 2024, it appears this rhetorical ambition could not overcome material shortfalls. The public 
narrative shift has subtly changed since 2014 as relations with the United States have strained, 
with both Merkel46 and defense minister von der Leyen changing Germany’s target away from 
the alliance agreed 2% to a lower 1.5% of GDP,47 with the narrative shifting towards a 
responsibility to European multilateralism.48  
The discrepancy between rhetorical ambition and actual implementation can best be 
described through an ontological lens. As the large increases necessary to reach the spending 
target (60 billion euros) would give Germany not only the largest defense budget in Europe but 
also the largest armed forces (were readiness issues to be resolved by the increased spending), 
Berlin faced an ontological dilemma. While the realities of the Ukraine crisis and a renewed 
territorial threat in Europe compelled a change in policy, the required changes would put serious 
pressure on the main autobiographical narrative. In attempting to win the support of her coalition 
partners, the Social Democrats, Merkel’s sub-narrative activations of alliance responsibility 
(transatlanticism/Europeanism) and an interpretation of history more supportive of engagement 
by deliberately referencing the German annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 in comparison to 
the Russian annexation of Crimea (historical guilt), failed to build a coalition. Then SPD leader 
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Martin Schulz stated clearly that “by reaching the 2% level, Germany would become the largest 
military power in Europe, that no one can want, due solely to our unique history.”49 Importantly, 
Schulz’s rhetoric was not only indicative of an attempt to maintain ontological security, but also 
a demonstration of the way in which material capabilities become embedded in shared social 
structures. Though many Germans did support increases in defense spending50, it seems that SPD 
rhetorical pressure was sufficient for the government to revise its spending targets low enough to 
be within the established identity narrative. Indeed, the Social Democratic finance minister Olaf 
Scholz further revised the proposed 2019 defense budget to reflect a budget decrease rather than 
the increase promised to NATO allies.51 In the defense budgeting space, the reigning 
responsibility narrative continues to tilt towards a rejection of normalcy (1) and militant pacifism 
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CHAPTER 5: GERMANY’S MILITARY IN THE WORLD 
The Balkans: Competing Narratives of Responsibility  
 The Balkan wars became the proving ground for post-Cold War Germany. The newly 
reunified state was quick to flex its new diplomatic muscles, beginning with the recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia following their declarations of independence in 1991. Germany’s Balkan 
interventions did not stop there, as Bundeswehr troops also took part in peacekeeping operations 
in Croatia and Bosnia, and ultimately participating in combat operations against Serbia during 
the 1999 Kosovo war.  It would mark the first use of German troops in combat since the Second 
World War, a particularly sensitive point as the former Yugoslavian states had once been 
invaded by the Nazi regime and had been the site of many genocidal policies. The interventions 
were also a strong example of external pressures on a state’s national identity, leading to a policy 
change and accompanying narrative interpretation in order to maintain ontological security. In 
order to maintain this security, a variety of sub-narratives were activated, particularly by the 
foreign and defense ministers across governments, to ensure German policy continued to fit 
within the main responsibility narrative.  
 As noted previously, the main elements of the German autobiographical narrative include 
a strong commitment to multilateralism. However, in the early days of the Balkan conflicts, it 
eschewed this line. During the episode, Germany under Kohl’s leadership pushed the European 
Economic Community and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe towards its 
desired policy of recognition, threatening unilateral action and defiance against any United 
Nations resolution that contradicted the policy. The Kohl government faced withering criticism 
from European partners, with Le Monde comparing the proposed unilateral recognition to the 
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establishment of the Ustase regime by Nazi officials in 1941. Furthermore, it was not seen 
particularly well that the coalition for recognition that Berlin had gathered included Italy, 
Hungary, and Austria, three other fascistic or fascist collaborator states during the 1930s and 
1940s.52 What explains this sudden abandonment of multilateralism in pursuit of foreign policy 
goals, coupled with action in the face of a negative historical narrative? Importantly, recognition 
was accompanied by the activation of a newer sub-narrative, that the lessons of history force 
upon Germany a duty to act in the name of humanitarianism. This is an interesting 
reinterpretation of Techau’s first element of the German narrative, that of historical guilt, this 
time compelling the newly unified state to action. Both foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
and defense minister Volker Rühe alluded to this, with Rühe specifically referring to recognition 
as a test of “moral credibility”.53 In a much stronger allusion, Genscher argued that Germany 
could not sit and “watch appeasement happen again.”54 By emphasizing the responsibility to 
oppose renewed aggression within Europe, Rühe and Genscher sidestepped the narrative that 
Germany had a responsibility not to intervene due to its military past in the region. (Interestingly, 
this move was not used consistently. In a later event, Rühe was pressured into stating that the 
newly founded Eurocorps would “not be a new Afrika Korps” due to the perception that it would 
be predominantly deployed in North Africa.55) 
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 In the case of Croatia and Slovenia, the blatant aggression of the Milošević regime 
against the breakaway states forced a historical lens on the conflict for German policymakers. 
Germany’s previous role as occupier and its own recently regained sovereignty (sub-narrative 4) 
led to diplomatic maneuvering that quickly put Germany and eventually the wider European 
Community into an openly anti-Milošević position. Intriguingly, German narratives of historical 
responsibility actively ignored the sponsorship of Croatian independence by the Nazi regime. It 
marked an important shift in Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, as it utilized an as yet 
untapped set of sub-narratives to justify a sudden policy shift away from multilateral diplomatic 
engagement and towards a unilateral policy justified by historical responsibility. Interestingly, 
when applied to Bosnia, Germany returned to European (6) and transatlantic (7) multilateralism, 
as well as restraint (5) as its main narratives in sending air, logistics, and medical assets to 
Bosnia and Croatia. Rühe was insistent in his use of the multilateral narrative, stating that all 
German forces involved in Bosnia were there to support NATO and United Nations 
peacekeepers, and no ground troops would play any combat role.56 What can be seen in this 
instance is a sort of calibration of the newly activated narrative, as sending combat troops at the 
time would have been beyond the narrative pale, breaching the still very active anti-militarist and 
restraint centric sub-narratives. Responsibility quickly shifted from one of a special place in 
history to recognize newly independent states towards the traditional responsibility to avoid 
using force.  
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 Several years later however, the anti-militarist and restraining narratives were once again 
deactivated to a much greater degree, and the reinterpretation of history would be activated with 
greater intensity as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer 
justified their policy of participating in NATO’s Operation Allied Force. The mission consisted 
of a bombing campaign that lasted nearly three months, and was designed to force Milošević to 
stop the ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars. As German airmen began carrying out 
airstrikes against Serbian forces and targets in Belgrade, both emphatically came forward with 
their historical justifications for force. Chancellor Schröder was clear in his use of history, 
arguing: “for the first time… German soldiers are fighting for one of the highest goals as such: 
for the saving of human lives and the protection of Human Rights.” Fischer would cause a much 
more public stir, contradicting decades of Green Party policy by advocating for a strong military 
response to Serbian aggression against Kosovars. His argumentation in which he reinterpreted 
the historical guilt sub-narrative, which had until that point been characterized by “never again 
war” (Nie wieder Krieg), was replaced by “never again Auschwitz” (Nie wieder Auschwitz), or a 
historical moral imperative to use force to prevent crimes similar to those perpetrated by the 
Nazis.57 The intensity of the rhetorical disagreement within the Green Party nearly caused a riot 
during the 1999 Bielefeld conference during which Fischer made his case. Regardless, the 
rhetorical argument succeeded in building a sufficient parliamentary coalition to support 
continued German military involvement in Kosovo.58 It would seem that German public opinion 
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strongly supported this narrative as well, with no less than 61% of those polled agreeing with 
airstrikes against the Serbian government.59 
These sentiments would continue to guide German security policy. By the early 21st 
century, humanitarian intervention and crisis management began to take center stage not only in 
Germany, but across the Western world. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Australian led 
force in Timor-Leste, and the British operation in Sierra Leone became the expected archetypal 
military operation of the 21st century. Following the outright failures to prevent mass atrocities in 
central Africa and the Balkans throughout the 1990s, states sought to build a new international 
consensus on state behavior that would solidify a norm against using state sovereignty as a veil 
to hide mass atrocities behind. Germany, having embraced the humanitarian intervention norm 
using its reinterpreted historical narrative of responsibility, threw its diplomatic weight behind 
the Responsibility to Protect norm (R2P) at an international congress on state sovereignty in 
2001. Representing Germany at the conference was the Bundeswehr general Klaus Naumann, 
who had directed German forces on behalf of NATO during the Kosovo intervention.60 It would 
seem that through the calamities of the Balkan conflicts, the main autobiographical narrative was 
able to overcome significant ontological pressure by reinterpreting the historical guilt narrative 
into one of action rather than reticence. This was a dual shift in reinterpreting sub-narratives one 
and four, turning historical guilt and a newly found sovereignty into a moral imperative. Not 
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only that, it had the rhetorical strength to capture German public opinion and diplomatically tie 
Berlin to an interventionist norm. 
Afghanistan: Fighting without War 
 “You couldn’t compare what 7,000 Brits in Helmand were doing with the Germans 
loafing up in Herat who weren’t even allowed to go out at night.”61 This insight from Patrick 
Hennessy’s memoir of the war in Afghanistan is indicative of the broader sentiment of 
Germany’s NATO partners about its mission in northern Afghanistan. At an event attended by a 
variety of American and British army officers, these sentiments were made more than clear in 
offhand discussions about the war.62 Far from the nuanced policy debates of think-tanks and 
ministerial meetings, the German political activation of sub-narratives reaches down even into 
the operational details of the German contingent in NATO’s mission to Afghanistan.  
 Beginning in 2002, only three years after Kosovo, German troops began what would 
become part of most countries’ longest military deployments in their modern histories. Ordered 
in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent resolution in the North 
Atlantic Council in support of U.S. actions, Chancellor Schröder joined the force. Interestingly, 
in justifying the mission, his government chose not only to activate the transatlanticism (7) sub-
narrative as might be expected, but also continued along the same narrative path as had been 
taken in Kosovo and utilized its reinterpreted historical memory as a strong argument in support 
of its actions. In this instance, Schröder preempted ontological pressure by ensuring not only a 
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multilateral argument, but a moral one as well. The intervention was not presented by the 
government or the Bundeswehr as being part of the U.S. war on terror, but rather a humanitarian 
mission focused on reconstruction, infrastructure, and “drilling wells and building schools for 
girls.”63 As noted in an interview with Schröder in Der Spiegel64, this justification would cause a 
significant amount of pressure on the responsibility narrative, as burden-sharing between NATO 
partners became increasingly differentiated.  
 At face value, Germany has made a significant commitment to the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. Often either the second or third in number of troops deployed, it has shouldered its 
share of casualties in the conflict, including 53 killed.65 However, commitment should not only 
be measured quantitatively. Numbers can often betray effectiveness, and if the sentiments of 
partner nations’ forces in Afghanistan are to be taken as analytically valuable, they must 
complement the numerical commitment. What makes the German deployment qualitatively 
different from the American or British missions? The answer does not lie in the command rooms 
of Mazar-i-Sharif (the Bundeswehr headquarters in Afghanistan), but in Berlin. The attempt to 
maintain ontological security by utilizing a moralistic argument for armed force began to present 
serious issues as the operation unfolded. Firstly, the German government did not refer to the 
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conflict as a war. Due to the ever-present anti-militarist streak in both the often coalition 
governing Social Democrats and the population at large, it was never referred to as such since 
“Germans don’t make war.”66 Indeed, the militant pacifist sub-narrative (2) continued to act 
silently, leading to a disconnect between Germany and its troops in Afghanistan, which as will 
be seen later caused a serious public outcry. 
Secondly, the rules of engagement set in Berlin were highly restrictive, and effectively 
micromanaged the mission. One NATO official was quoted describing the German mandate as a 
“political straitjacket” that made it impossible for German troops to effectively stabilize the 
northern provinces into which they were sent.67 This became readily apparent during an 
operation in March 2008, in which German special forces had tracked a Taliban commander 
responsible for an array of attacks against civilians, but were unable to use lethal force once he 
was found as troops were not authorized to use force outside of self-defense. The commander’s 
network remained active, and likely played a role in the increase in insurgent activity as the war 
progressed in the 2010s.68 This caused serious friction with NATO allies. Then US Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates expressed his fears that NATO had become a “two-tiered” alliance, 
“between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and 
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talking tasks and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions.”69 This sentiment is reflected in 
the quotes from US and UK officers above, who felt that they faced an unfair burden in their 
missions due to the hamstrung German troops. This intense scrutiny of German contributions 
inflicted maximum pressure on Germany’s autobiographical narrative as a “responsible ally” in 
Afghanistan, and its two justifying sub-narratives of transatlanticism and humanitarianism were 
in conflict with one another. The realities of the Afghan war and its alliance commitments 
required a much more robust German engagement, but its presentation to the German public 
would not allow German politicians to authorize such a rule change.  
 By 2009, the situation came to a head. Following an airstrike ordered by a Bundeswehr 
colonel that killed over 90 civilians, the reality of war became more apparent to the German 
people. In the months leading up to the strike, the rules of engagement for German forces had 
been loosened, allowing for the use of allied air power by ground commanders without any prior 
approval. Meanwhile, the narrative for the operation remained unchanged, and those in Germany 
still considered the operation a relatively peaceful, humanitarian style mission.70 The strike, 
being so large and taking such a toll, could not be ignored by the German public. This led to a 
large public outcry, with many surprised that Bundeswehr troops were actually involved in 
combat operations.71 The immediate implications were the removal of Defense Minister Jung 
from his position, along with several senior Bundeswehr officials.72 More importantly, while 
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politicians prior to the strike were unwilling to even use the word “war” in respect to 
Afghanistan, the incoming defense minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenburg described the ongoing 
situation in northern Afghanistan as a war, and strongly supported a more aggressive force 
posture along with authorizing more large-scale joint operations that were allowed to venture out 
after dark and outside of the normal parliamentary mandate.73  
 Using an ontological lens, the activation and deactivation of sub-narratives happened as 
may be expected. Firstly, the anti-militarist and no public debate elements were quickly 
eschewed as the new defense minister sought to have a public discussion about the role of the 
Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, simultaneously moving away from humanitarian rhetoric (historical 
guilt, sub-narrative 1) and emphasizing renewed transatlanticism and alliance responsibility (7) 
over the previous justifications. Interestingly, a newer element entered the frame during this 
debate as well: a responsibility to German soldiers. The 2016 White Paper on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr repeatedly calls for renewed investments in doctrinal 
planning, tactical level training, and spending increases in order to fulfill a public responsibility 
to the soldiers themselves.74 German defense policy in Afghanistan changed radically following 
a serious public crisis that put immense strain on the German autobiographical narrative as it 
pertained to Afghanistan. As policies shifted to a more aggressive, pro-military stance, the 
rhetoric chosen by the government was more reflective of alliance responsibility and 
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responsibility to German troops, changing a nearly decade long policy of portraying the war as a 
humanitarian operation and limiting public discussion about the course of the conflict. 
The Baltics: A Return to Responsibility?  
 Germany had been the frontline country during the Cold War. Had tensions suddenly 
become hot, the vast majority of the country would have been destroyed whether the conflict had 
been conventional or nuclear. Today, the Baltic states find themselves as the new front line in 
tensions with Russia. Russian forces remain massed in the Western Military District, and have 
been keen to show off their new prowess gained from their reforms and combat experience in the 
Caucasus, Ukraine, and Syria. The Zapad (West) exercises of 2017 and 2018 demonstrated 
Russia’s ability to quickly concentrate forces near the Baltics, and Western defense analysts have 
described in detail via wargames how Russia could overrun the Baltic states within 72 hours.75 In 
response to this threat, NATO authorized the deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence 
(EFP) mission to deter Russian aggression. Germany quickly took a lead role in the mission, 
volunteering to be a lead nation for the battlegroup stationed in Lithuania.76 It has also 
contributed to the Baltic Air Policing mission based in Estonia on a rotating basis, providing four 
Eurofighter jets to routine patrols over Baltic airspace.77 The questions are then, how has 
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Germany justified this action, and does a need to maintain ontological security complicate the 
efficacy of the mission?  
 Both Chancellor Merkel78 and Defense Minister von der Leyen79 have routinely invoked 
their fidelity to NATO alliance security during their respective justifications for participating in 
these missions. Not only this, but two other sub-narratives have been activated as well. First, a 
twist on one used by ministers during the Balkan Wars, and the second a use of the self-
determination and renewed sovereignty devices. During a speech while visiting the German 
contribution to the EFP in Lithuania, von der Leyen addressed the unique Baltic past with 
territorial aggression, deliberately highlighting the historical experience of the Soviet invasion of 
the Baltics in 1940.80 This use of historical memory is unique not necessarily in what was said, 
but rather what was deactivated. During the Balkan wars, ministers had argued that Germany had 
a unique responsibility to intervene due to its past role as occupier in the region. In von der 
Leyen’s speech only the Soviet invasion was mentioned, not the German occupation. This 
highlights a subtle, but possibly important narrative shift. In moving away from a guilt-laden 
justification and towards a more assertive, defensive tone, the narrative is now one of a 
responsibility to defend a historically aggrieved ally from a mutually perceived aggressor. This is 
also reflective of the differing historical circumstances in the region, as some in the Baltics had 
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considered German troops liberators rather than aggressors in the 1940s.81 In regard to the 
second narrative activation, von der Leyen highlighted an interesting similarity between the 
Baltics today and German history. “We Germans know what it meant to live on the border of the 
Warsaw Pact countries. The Allies provided us with security so that a prosperous West Germany 
could be created. We haven't forgotten that.”82 This new solidaristic argument is reflective of the 
regaining of sovereignty sub-narrative (4), implying that as Germany had been a good ally 
during the Cold War as a frontline state, it now has a responsibility to protect others states that 
had recently regained their sovereignty in a similar fashion and are concurrently new frontline 
states.  
 This responsibility narrative has not gone unchallenged however. The traditionally 
Russia-sympathetic Social Democratic party has criticized moves to increase troop levels in the 
eastern states, describing the operations as “sabre-rattling and war cries.” Former foreign 
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was quoted saying, “Whoever believes that symbolic tank 
parades on the alliance’s eastern border will bring more security is mistaken. We are well-
advised not to create pretexts to renew an old confrontation.”83 This approach is not entirely 
unrelated to a responsibility narrative as well, being indicative of the “entitlement to be left in 
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peace” (3) and anti-militarist (2) sub-narratives. These activations are coupled with the party’s 
historical tendencies towards détente with Russia, exemplified by Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in 
the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the more recent cordial relationship between Gerhard Schröder 
and Vladimir Putin. More militaristic policies are seen to be at odds with a more soft-handed 
economic approach to Russia referred to as “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade), in 
which it is argued that increased trade ties and closer societal interactions will gradually bring 
Russia closer to Germany’s democratic and market standards.84 This view is not only held by the 
Ostpolitik Social Democrats, but also by some business friendly Christian Democrats, whose 
leadership has been particularly supportive in developing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that 
many have argued threatens the economic and energy security of the Baltic states. This is less 
indicative of a responsibility focused narrative, though it does still emphasize the uniqueness of 
Germany’s role as an economic power vis-à-vis Russia.  
 It is not entirely clear which narrative activations will be able to win a broader coalition 
to begin building a more coherent Baltic strategy. Moves thus far have been fairly incoherent, 
with the increased troop levels being met with a concurrent commitment to invest in the Russian 
gas pipeline to Germany that could threaten Baltic energy security, Nord Stream 2. German 
public opinion is difficult to decipher as well. While NATO has been seen increasingly 
favorably, a majority of Germans are not supportive of militarily defending an ally in the event 
of Russian aggression (40% to 38%).85  
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It would be difficult to speculate on how this narrative impasse could be resolved, but the 
ontological lens and past experiences can lend some useful predictions. As seen in each previous 
case, when two conflicting constellations of sub-narratives collide, there can often be policy 
stagnation, or at least willful avoidance. This was especially seen in Afghanistan prior to the 
Kunduz strike. Should a more serious crisis break out in the Baltics, the two responsibility 
narratives would surely collide, and those elites who can make a stronger appeal to historical 
narratives are likely to find themselves victorious, as was seen in the Balkans. The public 
opinion data is particularly interesting, as it undermines the CDU position in support of 
transatlanticism and multilateralism in the region, by revealing it as a hollow commitment 
without public support. This is on top of the material realities from the lack of effective material 
capabilities intended to support the rhetorical ambition towards alliance security.86 The Baltic 
case is a potential powder keg for German policymakers. It is a crossroads between historical 
memory, alliance commitments, commitments to multilateral solutions with Russia, and a long-
standing underinvestment in military readiness. Utilizing an ontological lens focusing on which 
sub-narratives well-placed political elites choose to activate, will likely be the most indicative 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 It may be that the autobiographical narrative has shifted increasingly towards an 
interpretation of responsibility and reliability towards allies, be they either NATO or solely 
European. As seen above, the involvement of German forces in Kosovo, the invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the deterrent forces in the Baltics could signal an important shift in this 
direction. Both Merkel and defense minister von der Leyen have at the very least signaled their 
support for increased spending and deployments to allied countries, though not matching this 
with actual increases. Merkel’s chosen successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, has gone a step 
further, arguing for both a large increase in defense spending that could have “domestic 
consequences” (implying a diversion of financing from social services towards defense) and the 
use of German naval forces to blockade Russian ship movement from the Sea of Azov.87 As 
noted earlier however, this would have little support with the CDU’s Grand Coalition partners, 
the SPD. What this thesis has also demonstrated is that these commitments can be hollow in 
implementation, due often to a lack of material resources, troops, or financing. This discrepancy 
can best be explained through attempts to maintain German ontological security, in that policies 
are shaped to fit certain sub-narratives, but can often conflict with co-existing sub-narratives. 
These lead to clashes where policies either remain stagnant or shift rather unexpectedly.  
                                               
87 Andreas Rinke and Paul Carrel, “Merkel protégé suggests blockade of Russian ships over Ukraine 





 Commentators have rightly characterized German security and defense policy as in a 
“dreamland”, though it is not entirely in a “discursive vegetative state”. Contestations over 
rhetorical justifications have occurred across the full spectrum of security policy, and it would 
seem the taboo is continuing to be lifted, even approaching the ultimate taboo of nuclear 
weapons.88 German policy enters an incoherent dream state as clashing identity sub-narratives 
have led to incoherent policy justifications, infighting between coalition partners and within 
parties (especially over issues related to anti-militarism and Russia policy), and inconsistencies 
between the political and the operational during military deployments. German policy debates 
and rhetorical shifts demonstrate clearly how shared knowledge is often a contested concept, 
rather than a static and singular “strategic culture”. Furthermore, material capabilities are heavily 
embedded within historical understandings of Germany’s role. These constructivist concepts 
inform the ontological security assumption that a secure identity is sought just as much as 
physical security, sometimes even at the expense of the physical. 
This thesis has sought to answer two questions: 1) how does the German political 
community justify its foreign policy behavior and 2) why is there often a discrepancy between 
Germany’s foreign policy rhetorical ambition and the actual implementation of policy? Utilizing 
the cases of defense spending debates, the Balkan conflicts, the war in Afghanistan, and the 
newly initiated deterrent operations in the Baltics, it has shown that German political elites 
activate and deactivate certain identity sub-narratives (often being found among the eight 
identified by Techau) in order to fit a given policy change with the broader autobiographical 
identity narrative of Verantwortungspolitik (politics of responsibility). Be it a responsibility to 
                                               
88 Ulrich Kühn, Tristan Volpe, and Bert Thompson, “Tracking the German Nuclear Debate,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, last updated August 15, 2018, available at: 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/15/tracking-german-nuclear-debate-pub-72884  
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avoid militaristic defense spending, to protect civilians from mass atrocities, or to act as a 
responsible ally in conflict zones, each has a clear activation/deactivation dynamic that occurs. 
The argument that states seek to maintain not only physical security but also ontological security 
is a robust one, and the German case is an ideal opportunity to explore these dynamics both 
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